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1 have clearly shown that the railway played a fundamental role in Spain’s 
economic growth between the middle of the 19
th century and the Civil War of 1936. Did the 
same happen from 1939 onwards? In other words, what has been the railway’s contribution 
since precisely the moment at which there was a turning point in the modernizing process 
that substantially changed Spain’s economic and social structures?  
 
At first glance, a number of facts appear to indicate that this initial assertion cannot be 
upheld, given that the Spanish railway
2, which had not had a competitor during the earlier 
period, rapidly surrendered its hegemony to the road in the domestic transport market. 
Despite being able to treble its output
3, it could not prevent the sharp decline of its market 
share, which, in relation to both passengers and goods, fell from 52% in 1950 to just 5% in 
1998. The national economic statistics provide an account of this process, given that even 
though the railway’s contribution to the GNPcf increased 13-fold between 1965 and 1982, it 
dropped by 2.6% within the «transport» item, falling from 18.8 to 16.2%. If we measure this 
contribution according to gross added value (1986 market prices in pesetas), its relative loss 
would reach 25% in the 1980-1997 period. 
 
In spite of the initially convincing nature of these figures, an evaluation of the railway’s 
contribution to Spain’s economic growth will enable us to discover how this contribution has 
continued to be positive and, above all, to specify it in absolute and relative terms. The aim of 
this article lies precisely in making an initial evaluation of this contribution, even though this 
task poses significant methodological difficulties. For this purpose I will resort to the classic 
proposal made by Hirschman, which consists in differentiating between linkages forward and 
linkages backward, whose virtues and limitations were explained by Comín
4. 
 
2. The economic resources used by Renfe 
 
Firstly, in order to achieve this aim, we must quantify the economic resources used by Renfe 
during this period, since, logically, it is these resources that enable it to develop the transport 
supply and contribute to the growth of other sectors through its demands. As can be seen in 
table 1, these resources, between 1941-1998, amounted to 16.4 billion 1980 pesetas, of 
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Table 1. Resources used by Renfe between 1941 and 1998. 
(thousands of millions 1980 pesetas) 
Item Investments Operating 
Costs 
Total % 
Personnel 0 6.979.3 6.973.3  42.5
Rolling Stock  1818.5 3.892.6 5.711.1 34.8
Infrastructure 2.069 0.5 2.069.6  12.
Energy 0 1.029.9 1.029.0  6.3
Others 421.3 206.7 628.0  3.8
Total 4.308.9 12.109.0 16.417.9    100
Source: Miguel Muñoz, Renfe (1941-1991). Medio siglo de ferrocarril público, (Madrid, 
Ed. Luna, 1995). 
                                           
As table 2 shows, the investments were mainly divided between infrastructure, which 
absorbed 46.3% of these resources, and rolling stock, which accounted for 34.9% of the 
total. The available information allows us to differentiate between an initial investment cycle 
characterised by its extreme lack of vitality, given that only 129 million pesetas were used 
between 1941 and 1949, and a second cycle between 1950 and 1962 which multiplied this 
sum by 27.7- Between 1963 and 1974, the Ten-Year Modernization Plan (Plan Decenal de 
Modernización -PDM-)
5 gave rise to the largest investment of the 20th century up until that 
time: 28.408 million pesetas, as compared with the 3.697 million used in the preceding 23 
years. Although one might think that it was this situation that provoked a turning point, the 
truth of the matter is that it was during the period of Democratic Transition that the railway 
received the most resources, since the following investment cycle corresponding to the 1975-
1983 period accounted for 3,8 billion, a sum which is nevertheless considerably lower than 
the 4.3 billion received between 1984 and 1998. 
  
 
As far as operating costs are concerned, it should be pointed out that it was the personnel 
item that absorbed the most resources, with 57.6%, followed by rolling stock with 32.1% and, 
a long way behind, rolling stock and energy with 10.6%. As in the previous case, the 
evolution of the operating costs comprises a relatively inactive stage during the 1940s with 
1.082 million, followed by a second stage between 1950 and 1962 which multiplied the 
previous amount by 11.3 to give a total of 12.287 million. The PDM years represented a 
significant advance, given that 60.488 million pesetas were used during the course of these 
11 financial years, as compared with the 1,8 billion of the preceding 21 years, due to the 
strong influence of the personnel item. And finally, the Democratic Transition period 
witnessed the stabilization of this level, with 1.1 billion between 1975 and 1983, and then a 
considerable increase with 10.9 billion between 1984 and 1998. 
 
In overall terms, the personnel item has benefited the most, with a total of 6.97 billion 1980 
pesetas (42.5%), followed by rolling stock with 5.7 billion (34.8%), infrastructure with 2.1 
billion (12.6%) and energy with 1 billion (6.3%). Therefore, without taking personnel costs 
into account, the resources used by Renfe that could directly increase the output of other 
economic sectors amounted to 88 billion pesetas between 1941 and 1998.  
 
The very distribution of these resources increases the possibilities of accurately evaluating 
Renfe’s contribution to Spain’s economic growth, since fortunately, the personnel, rolling 
stock, infrastructure and energy items, which represent 89,3% of all the resources used, are 
easily accessible. This lends the present task a high level of virtuality, which is increased a 
little more thanks to the most significant items of the infrastructure group, whereas it is 
impossible to know the breakdown of the “unspecified” item.  
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Table 2. Renfe Investments (thousands of millions of 1980 pesetas). 







  TRACKS STATION  INSTALLATION REAL 
ESTATE 
OTHERS TOTAL  TRACTION  TRAILERS RAILCARS TOTAL     
1941-1949 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
1950-1962 1.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 1.7 0.0  0.0 0.0 1.7 0.1 3.6 
1963-1974 3.5 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 5.9 0.0  0.0 0.0 4.8 1.4 28.4 
1975-1983 162.5 20.1 11.8 8.8 0.0 254.7 4.8  0.0 0.0 148.6 72.7 476.0 
1984-1998 891.0 171.3 573.8 2.6 151.3 1.806.8 347.0  309.9 922.5 1.663.4 331.1 3.801.2 
Total 1.058.3 192  586.3 11.6 151.5 2.069.1 351.8  309.9 922.5 1.818.5 405.2 4.309.3 
Source: Miguel Muñoz, Renfe (1941-1991). Medio siglo de ferrocarril público, (Madrid, Ed. Luna, 1995). 
 a: The partial totals of 1970, 1981 and 1987, and the totals of 1971-1974.  b: The partial totals of 1987 are missing.  c: The partial totals of 
1971-74 and 1981 are missing.  
 
Table 3. RENFE Operating Costs (thousands of millions of 1980 pesetas).  
















1941-1949 0.5  0.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.1 
1950-1962 5.8  0.3 0.6 2.3 0.4 1.0 2.3 0.8 1.0 12.3 
1963-1974 39.4  0.2  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 7.3 13.2 0.4 60.5 
1975-1983 704.5  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 79.2 316.6 -0.1 1.100.1 
1984-1998 6.222.6  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 941.1 3.562.1 199.9 10.931.7 
Total 6.987.7  0.6  0.8 2.9 0.5 1.3 1.029.9 3.892.6 201.4 12.105.7 




3. The «backward» effects 
3.1. Concerning Employment 
 
In the light of the figures presented in the previous section, it is clear that Renfe’s main 
contribution during this half-century has consisted in maintaining permanent employees. As 
table 4 shows, this public company inherited 110,164 employees from the private railway 
companies, 19.5% of whom were temporary workers. The curve which indicates the 
evolution of employment begins with an initial stage which lasts until 1954, during which 
employment rose to its historic maximum of 137,622 employees due to the gradual 
transformation of temporary employees into permanent employees, to the extent that this 
segment represented slightly more than 1% in this final year, which, in short, marks the 
turning point between the first stage and the second stage, which lasts until 1982, when 
there was a sharp drop of 66,000 employees. It should be pointed out that the gradual 
reduction in the number of employees between 1954 and 1963 was uninterrupted, since the 
curve follows a continuous downward path which is only accentuated during the period 
between 1963 and 1974 as a consequence of the application of the PDM, given that the 
funding provided by the World Bank demanded a drastic reduction in return: compare the 
13% decrease between 1954 and 1963 with the 40% reduction between 1963 and 1975.  
 
Table 4. Renfe's Contribution to employment (thousands) 
Year Nª  employees Year Nª  employees Year Nª  employees 
1942  110,2      
1943  122,7  1962 126,5  1981 71,5 
1944  121,5  1963 119,8  1982 74 
1945  116,1  1964 114,1  1983 75 
1946  118,1  1965 111,2  1984 70,2 
1947  120,2  1966 108,5  1985 65,9 
1948  124,8  1967 104,5  1986 64,2 
1949  132,7  1968 98,3  1987 53,6 
1950  132,9  1969 88,2  1988 50,6 
1951  137,2  1970 82,6  1989 49,9 
1952  139,1  1971 79  1990 49,3 
1953  139,5  1972 77  1991 48,5 
1954  137,6  1973 73,4  1992 46 
1955  135,3  1974 72,7  1993 41,6 
1956  133,4  1975 72  1994 40,2 
1957  132,4  1976 72  1995 38,2 
1958  130,3  1977 72,3  1996 36,8 
1959  129,2  1978 72,3  1997 36 
1960  129,3  1979 70,2  1998 34,9 
1961  127,4  1980 70,9  1999 34,3 
Source: Miguel Muñoz, Renfe (1941-1991). Medio siglo de ferrocarril 
público, (Madrid, Ed. Luna, 1995). 
 
 
During the “transition” years of UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático) mandates, a policy of 
employment stability was maintained as an immediate consequence of the successive 
governments’ interest in not provoking industrial disputes at a company that was regarded as 
a reference point for collective bargaining in the rest of the large sectors. The year of 1982 
represented another turning point which, despite allowing a significant increase of 2,478 
employees as a consequence of the application of the agreement between Calvo Sotelo’s 
government and the unions, also marked the beginning of a final stage in which the number  
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of employees constantly fell, especially from 1985 onwards, thanks to successive early 
retirement agreements, leading to a staff of 34,984 in 1998.  
 
Table 5. Renfe's Contribution to Employment (%) 
Year  Active Population  Working Pop. S.  Working Pop. Sector  Working Pop. 
Transport and 
Comunications 
1950   1,2 
1964   0,9   3,3  18,0
1965   0,9   3,0  16,7
1966   0,9   2,9  16,3
1967   0,8   2,7  15,0
1968   0,8   2,5  13,7
1969   0,7   2,2  12,0
1970   0,7   2,0  11,3
1971   0,6   1,8  11,0
1972   0,6   1,7  10,8
1973   0,5   1,5  10,6
1974   0,5   1,5  10,2
1975   0,5   1,4  10,1
1976   0,5   1,4  10,4  5,4
1977   0,5   1,4  10,7  5,3
1978   0,5   1,4  11,1  4,9
1979   0,5   1,3  10,7  4,7
1980   0,6   1,4  10,8  4,5
1981   0,6   1,4  11,1  4,5
1982   0,6   1,4  11,5  4,4
1983   0,6   1,4  12,3  4,1
1984   0,5   1,4  11,6  4,0
1985   0,5   1,2  10,7  3,5
1986   0,5   1,1  10,2  3,4
1987   0,4   0,9  9,7  3,0
1988   0,3   0,8  9,6  2,6
1989   0,3   0,7  8,5  2,4
1990   0,3   0,7  8,5  2,3
1991   0,3   0,7  8,4  2,2
1992   0,3   0,7  8,0  2,1
1993   0,3   0,6  7,7  2,0
1994   0,3   0,6  7,6  2,0
1995   0,2   0,5  6,8  1,8
1996   0,2   0,5  6,4  1,6
1997   0,2   0,5  6,0  1,6
1998   0,2   0,4  5,7  1,6




As table 5 shows, the permanent employees supported by Renfe in 1950 represented 1.2% 
of the total active population, a figure which remained practically the same in 1960, having 
fallen by only 0.1%. From then on it proceeded to fall steadily until it represented just 0.2% in 
1999. In relation to employment in the service sector, the jobs provided by Renfe 
represented 3.3% in 1964, before falling to 0.4% by 1999. Although it may be concluded that 
Renfe’s contribution to employment has gradually decreased in relative importance with 
respect to total employment, in 1998 it still represented 5.7% of all the employment  
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generated by the transport and communications sub-sector, although it is true that the 
equivalent figure for 1964 was 18%. Moreover, in 1995 Renfe’s staff still represented 5.7% of 
the permanent jobs generated by the 207 companies which had more than 1,000 
employees
6, and the company was the third largest employer in the country after Telefónica 
de España and El Corte Inglés. 
 
We must conclude, therefore, that as far as this aspect is concerned, the railway generated 
permanent employment up until the mid-1950s, thus continuing the dynamic of the private 
companies it succeeded. Since then, however, its contribution has been negative, given that 
it has reduced its permanent staff by 74%, although in relative terms it has still retained a 
significant social importance and improved the quality of this employment by slowly reversing 
an initial situation characterised by a majority proportion of unskilled jobs
7. 
 
3.2. Concerning the rolling stock manufacturing sector 
 
As has already been said, the second most important «backward» contribution relates to 
rolling stock. In this case
8 it is worth remembering that the turning point is situated around the 
time of the First World War, given that the interruption of foreign supplies of rolling stock 
permitted the consolidation of a number of Spanish companies, whose contribution up until 
then could only be described as modest, despite them having been active for many years. 
These circumstances gave rise to a national sector capable of meeting, from then until the 
1970s, a large proportion of the Spanish railway operators’ demands thanks to the 
institutional support it always received. A sector which, in any case, never ceased to be 
entirely dependent on technology, which converted its foreign relations into a strategic issue, 
and whose composition would remain very stable over four decades. 
 
The 1940s brought with them a situation which was very similar to that which had arisen 
during the First World War, only on this occasion the domestic situation was favoured by the 
need to replace a large part of the rolling stock that had been destroyed during the Spanish 
Civil War. A new set of circumstances seemed to pave the way for an expansion of the 
national sector, an expansion whose principal guarantee was the new political regime’s 
determination to achieve self-sufficiency, which led to the domestic market being reserved 
exclusively for the national companies, nearly all of which were absorbed into Renfe from 
then on. However, these prospects were soon thwarted as a result of the autarchy denying 
these companies the necessary resources for overcoming the production lag caused by the 
war. On top of this, Renfe’s own demand, which during this period was focused on repairing 
the rolling stock that had been damaged during the conflict, did very little to stimulate this 
expansion. In fact, although it is true that the Franco regime carried out a great deal of 
legislative activity in the early 1940s in order to guarantee Renfe the incorporation of 
numerous units of rolling stock, it is equally undeniable that this activity was hesitant and 
largely ineffective, given that in the end, only 212 steam locomotives, 14 diesel railcars and 
9,822 wagons and vans were manufactured in Spain between April 1939 and March 1945.  
 
The advent of the PDM marked the beginning of a new stage in which Renfe would have 
more investment resources than ever before, amounting to 26,800 million pesetas during the 
1964-1973 period, of which 12,300 were allocated to the purchase of diesel locomotives, 
5,900 to electric locomotives and 8,600 to hauled stock, and with which, respectively, 458 
(“203” compositions), 86 (“276” compositions) and 7,790 units
9 were purchased. It was 
precisely this investment dynamism that demonstrated the sector’s serious structural 
problems, highlighting its lack of specialization, its dependence on a single source of demand 







Table 6 . Value of the output and employment of the 
rolling stock manufacturing sector 
Year 
Output Value 










































Source: Miguel Muñoz, Renfe (1941-1991). Medio siglo de ferrocarril 
público, (Madrid, Ed. Luna, 1995) and INE  
 
Thanks to the Industrial Survey conducted by the INE (National Institute of Statistics), we can 
see how this sector’s output underwent a steady growth between 1960 and 1998 (table 6), 
rising from 24,290.8 million constant pesetas in the first year to 40,018 million in the last 
year; i.e., it multiplied by a factor of 1.6 in real terms. The table in question clearly shows how 
this growth took place through a succession of expansions and slumps, which coincide  
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clearly with the evolution of Renfe’s demand. Thus, the phases of expansion occur in the 
periods 1960-66, 1972-75, 1979-82 y 1989-92, whereas the periods 1976-79 and 1983-88 
clearly indicate downswings.  
 
From a structural point of view we can indicate that in 1960 (the year in which this series of 
phases begins) the value of repairs still represented 43.1% of the total, followed by the 
construction of complete units with 34% and the manufacturing of loose parts with 23%. The 
average value of this structure did not undergo any substantial changes in the following 
years, since although the construction of complete units remained in the lead, it only 
represented 39% of the total, whereas repairs maintained a great importance with an 
average value of 28.9% and the manufacturing of loose parts was not far behind with a value 
of 25.1%. 
 
In 1960 these figures corresponded to 0.5% of the GNP, a percentage which remained 
stable during the 1960s before falling to 0.3% at the beginning of the next decade, since 
when it has remained stable at a relative value of 0.2%. If we compare the value of the 
specifically railway-related output, on the one hand, to the total output of transport materials, 
we find that the former represented 9.7% of the latter in 1963, a value which then proceeded 
to steadily fall to 5.7% by 1982. If, on the other hand, we make this comparison with the 
«metalworking industry» as a whole, we find that it represented 3.8% in 1963, before 
following a clear downward trend, albeit characterized by its instability, given that after falling 
to its lowest value of the series in 1978 (1.3%), it managed to recover in the following years 
to the point where it reached 2.5% in 1982. 
 
In table 6 we have represented the permanent employment provided by this sector. As we 
can see, it shows a clear downward trend, given that the figure of 22,251 jobs in 1960 fell to 
7,526 in 1997, with certain fluctuations that I think reflect the variations in temporary work 
that took place during the crisis periods. 
 
3.3. Concerning the energy sector 
 
As is well known, the need for significant quantities of coal to feed traction units meant that 
the railway rapidly became one of the most important sources of demand for this form of 
energy. Table 7 reckons its consumption -principal energy resource required by traction up 
until the mid-1960s- in 60 million tons between 1941 and 1968, which represented 17.9% of 
the total domestic output. Nevertheless, this percentage remained at about 24% until 1953, 
before falling as a result of the gradual substitution of coal with fuel oil as a means of 
powering steam locomotives and, above all, due to steam being replaced by other types of 
traction. These quantities, both in absolute and relative terms, clearly and unquestionably 
indicate how the Spanish railway became the principal source of demand for domestic coal 
during this period, and how the disappearance of this demand had a huge influence on the 














Table 7. The railway’s contribution to the domestic energy sector 
 Thousands 
of T. 
%  Thousands 
of  Kw/h 
% 
COAL  ELECTRICITY 
National output (1941-1968)  334,656    National output (1945-1960)  164,894
Railway consumption (1941-1968)  60,019 17.9 Railway consumption (1945-1960) 3,351 2.0
FUEL-OIL  National output (1961-1997)  3,706,552
National output (1960-1975)  184,419 Railway consumption (1961-1997)  42.842 1.2
Railway consumption (1960-1975)  5,763 3.1
GASOIL 
National output (1960-1992)  274,322
Railway consumption (1960-1992)  4,529 1.7
Source: Output figures CARRERAS, Albert (coord.), Estadísticas Históricas de España. Siglos XIX-XX, 
(Madrid, Fundación Banco Exterior, 1989) and INE; Consumption figures in Miguel Muñoz, Renfe (1941-
1991). Medio siglo de ferrocarril público, (Madrid, Ed. Luna, 1995). 
 
 
As a result of coal being replaced by fuel oil, the consumption of this energy source began to 
grow, increasing steadily up to the maximum of 607,000 tons in 1967, after which this figure 
gradually decreased until fuel oil’s disappearance in 1976. During the thirty-year period 
between 1946 and 1976, the consumption of fuel oil reached the far from negligible figure of 
7.6 million tons, which represents 3.1% of the national output of the 1960-1975 period. Coal 
and fuel oil were substituted as energy resources by gas oil and electricity. Although figures 
corresponding to gas oil followed an upward trend which produced a rise from 6,000 to 
195,000 tons between 1954 and 1975, this quantity eventually dropped to 107,000 by 1998. 
The final balance indicates a total consumption of 4.5 million tons between 1960 and 1992, 
which corresponds to 1.7% of the national output. This reduction indicates the increasing 
importance of electricity, whose considerably more dynamic evolution is proved by its 
constant growth during this period. After a moderate increase from 95 to 181 Gwh between 
1945 and 1954, it maintained a very stable growth, interspersed with the falls of 1975-76, 
1989 and 1993, until it reached the figure of 2,002 Gwh in 1998, Renfe thus becoming one of 
the main consumers of this type of energy, even though the percentage with respect to the 
national output was no more than 2% between 1945 and 1960 and 1.2% between 1961 and 
1997.  
 
3.4. Concerning the sectors deriving from the infrastructure 
 
The construction and the subsequent maintenance of the infrastructure emerge as further 
sources of demand within the railway industry. Unfortunately, we have very few figures at our 
disposal, and in many cases they even lack the continuity and homogeneity over time which 
are necessary for being able to study them properly. Without forgetting these difficulties, 
therefore, we can begin by pointing out that different elements are required to make up the 
platform, the most important ones being the ballast and the sleepers in terms of their relative 
value as part of the whole.  
 
As far as ballast is concerned, the existing figures show that, between 1947 and 1949, an 
annual average of 303 million cubic metres of ballast from Renfe’s quarries and other 
suppliers were used for the maintenance and conservation of the lines. In 1950 the quantity 
referred to rose to 1,183 million, which reflects the huge increase that would occur during this 
decade, since 12,910 million cubic metres were consumed between 1950 and 1959. This 
figure remained practically the same during the following decade (1960-69), standing at 
12,857 million. From then on, however, figures have only appeared sporadically, and  
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therefore it is only possible to state that, since 1968, consumption has fallen with clear 
instabilities and the notable demand deriving from the construction of the AVE, with 2.5 
million m
3 consumed. The absence of monographs does not allow us to go any further than 
stating that, in relation to this aspect, Renfe made it possible for a specialized ballast 
production sub-sector to develop, the supply of ballast currently being guaranteed by 21 
homologated quarries which provided 546,190 m
3 in 1997, which signified an investment of 
1,403 million pesetas, which includes both production and transportation, to which another 
30 million used for quality control purposes must be added
11. 
 
The second most important part of the platform are the sleepers, the majority of which were 
made of wood up until the 1950s. In 1963, the tracks comprised a total of 26.4 million 
wooden sleepers, as opposed to 2.8 million concrete sleepers and 0.3 million steel sleepers. 
Renfe set up the Forestry Service in order to guarantee the supply of wooden sleepers, 
giving rise to a specific history that would be worthy of its own monograph. Between 1942 
and 1967 Renfe used this service to acquire a total of 4.7 million cubic metres of wood, most 
of which came from the State Forests (55.7%) and from various town and city councils 
(33.7%), and which was used to make just over 20 million sleepers for the company itself, as 
well as another 0.6 million for narrow gauge railways and various products (dowels, blocks, 
boards, etc.)
12. The State Forests being the main beneficiary of this demand, it is also worth 
stating that the purchase of these 2.2 million m
3 between 1946 and 1966 represented a sum 
of 1,015 million pesetas, 46.1% of this entity’s liquid revenue corresponding to "Mountain 
product"
13. Yet Renfe’s demand between 1942 and 1971 amounted to 54.7 million, which it 
obtained not only through its forestry service, but also through voluntary contracts and 
obligatory quotas, all of which accounted for just under 3% of this forestry activity both in 
volume and in value. However, the contribution went beyond consumption alone, since it 
needed a specific industry, about which we know virtually nothing, given that the sleepers 
required a specific treatment that considerably increased their duration before being put in 
place. Of all the possible treatments, the most effective one involved the application of 
creosote, the result of mixing various oils obtained from the distillation of coal tar
14. Renfe 
carried out this activity internally thanks to the construction of 3 workshops in which 21.4 
million sleepers were treated between 1955 and 1968. 
 
During the 1920s, concrete began to be used as a raw material for making new sleepers. 
Despite the fact that this resource soon proved itself to be the most suitable for guaranteeing 
the stability of the platform, it was hardly used in our railways. Between 1954 and 1964, 
Renfe purchased 4.5 million of these sleepers, although it is true that 61% of them arrived 
between 1961 and 1964. It was not until 1954 that the RS concrete sleeper began to be 
manufactured, thanks to the creation of the R.S. Sleeper Factory in Torrejón de Ardoz, 
strategically located near the good sources of aggregates of the Henares and Jarama rivers 
and close to the Valderribas cement factory. There is little more we know about this story, 
suffice to say that this pioneer factory produced 2.7 million sleepers for RENFE between 
1954 and 1964, while another three factories also began to carry out this activity in the last 
year of this period. Although the incorporation of concrete sleepers has taken place 
gradually, replacing the wooden ones in the arterial network, the most important large-scale 
utilization has undoubtedly been that of the Madrid-Seville high-speed line, where nearly 1.6 





Table 8. The railway’s contribution to the iron and steel sector 




T t  % 
Consumption of National Steel by Rail (1947-
1963) 
334,082  
Consumption of National Steel by Small Material 
(1947-1963) 
189,186  
Total (1947-1963)............ 523,268 22,327,000 2.3
Consumption of Steel by Rail (1964-1973)  620,568  
Consumption of Steel by Rail (1974-1988)  356,508  
Total (1964-1988)............ 977,076 256,210,000 0.4
Consumption of Steel by Rolling Stock (1953-63) 269,152 17,953,000  1.5
Source: Consumption: Miguel Muñoz, Renfe (1941-1991). Medio siglo de ferrocarril público, (Madrid, 
Ed. Luna, 1995).; Output: CARRERAS, Albert (coord.), Estadísticas Históricas de España. Siglos XIX-
XX (Madrid, Fundación Banco Exterior, 1989). 
 
Another sector which has traditionally found the railway to be an excellent consumer is the 
iron and steel sector. The reports of Renfe’s Department of Tracks and Works put the figure 
corresponding to tons of rail used
15 between 1947 and 1963 at 482,081, of which 69.3% had 
been supplied by national factories, while the rest had been imported between 1955 and 
1962. According to the average purchase price indicated by the same source, this meant an 
investment of 1,871 million pesetas. On the other hand, 210,207 tons were used in the 
consumption of small track material (plates, joints, splices, screws, spikes, etc.), 90% of 
which was provided by Spanish steelworks and whose first cost amounted to 1,214 million 
current pesetas. In total, the consumption of these 523,268 tons represented 2.3 of the 
national steel output between 1947-1963. 
 
From 1963 onwards, the figures lose their main virtues, which for the 1964-1973 period can 
be compensated for by what little we know about the application of the PDM. According to a 
report produced by the BIRF
16, the PDM was responsible for renovating 5,746 km of the 
7,000 km of track covered by the plan, which involved an expenditure of 15,200 million 
pesetas. If we bear in mind that only 54 kg/ml rail was used, we find that 620,568 tons of 
steel were used, a quantity which must be increased with the track equipment and which, in 
any case, is only slightly higher than in the previous period. After this period Renfe’s 
contribution is silenced by the absence of data, and it is only possible to state that, between 
1974 and 1988, 3,301 km of track were renovated with 54 kg/ml rail, which meant a 
consumption of 356,508 tons of steel. In overall terms, this means that Renfe consumed 
977,076 tons of steel between 1963 and 1988, which represented 0.4% of the total national 
output. 
 
Another major consumer of iron and steel products was the rolling stock (exclusively 
comprising auxiliary elements of the locomotives, such as plates, stay bolts, springs, axles, 
drawn steel tubes, etc.). The figures at our disposal indicate a consumption, between 1953 
and 1963, of 269,152 tons supplied by national steelworks and 269,152 imported tons, a 
quantity that certainly cannot be regarded as negligible given that it corresponds to the 
consumption of auxiliary elements for locomotives. In this case the consumption of national 
steel only represented 1.5% of the total national output for the period in question. Finally, it is 
worth pointing out that Renfe also acted as a supplier of iron and steel products by means of 
the scrap offered to the market, which amounted to 392,000 tons between 1954 and 1962, 
providing an income of 908 million pesetas. 
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To finish this section, we will make a few comments about the information contained in table 
9, which shows the warehouse material expenditure of Renfe’s Infrastructure Business Unit 
during this final decade. As we can see, the total investment for this item, during an unstable 
cycle, amounted to 95,252 million current pesetas. The breakdown of this investment reveals 
that the platform materials are the ones which absorb the most resources, the concrete 
sleepers leading the table with 21% of the total, followed by ballast, switch gear and rail. This 
section is completed with small track material and the wooden sleepers. It is noticeable that 
the resources with the most added value, i.e. those required for electrification, safety 
installations and telecommunications, absorb the smallest amounts of this expenditure. The 
nature of this information does not allow us to go beyond these comments, so perhaps the 
most significant conclusion to be drawn is that the infrastructure seems to remain extremely 
stable over time in terms of its demand for raw materials. 
 
 
Table 9. Consumption of warehouse materials of Renfe’s Infrastructure Business Unit 
(millions of pesetas) 
1991 1992 1993  1994 1995 1996  1997  1998  1999 TOTAL
CONCRETE 
SLEEPERS 
2.131 2.457 2.286 1.925 2.450 3.125 1.936 1.909 1.778 19.997
BALLAST 1.934  2.204 2.084 1.746 2.239 2.684 1.882 1.694 1.682 18.149
SWITCH GEAR  1.909  2.196 2.028 1.703 2.248 2.774 1.659 1.676 1.898 18.091
RAIL 1.402  1.542 1.493 1.279 1.683 1.616 1.469 1.363 1.406 13.253
ELECTRIFICATIÓN  985  1.119 1.072 889 1.135 1.344 1.015 824 837 9.220
SMALL TRACK 
MATERIAL 
838  933 864 772 1.016 1.033 717 956 848 7.977
SAFETY 
INSTALLATIONS 
460  508 462 403 602 542 354 460 736 4.527
WOODEN  SLEEPERS  221  216 193 226 309 97 132 495 298 2.187
TELECOMMUNICAT- 
IONS 
191  224 193 167 234 305 110 183 244 1.851
TOTAL............. 10.071 11.399 10.675 9.110 11.916 13.520 9.274 9.560 9.727 95.252
Source: Report produced by Renfe’s Infrastructure Maintenance Business Unit (1999). 
 
 
3.5. Concerning the data processing sector 
 
This is a sector in which Renfe has performed a pioneering task by introducing the electronic 
sale of tickets in the 1960s. This involved a very heavy investment, but more importantly it 
also led to the company establishing a line of research that now enables it to develop its own 
programmes thanks to a business unit that is specifically devoted to this task. Without 
wishing to go any further than giving evidence of this contribution, and bearing in mind the 
relative scarcity of figures at our disposal, it should be emphasised that Renfe invested 
nearly 62 million pesetas in this sector in 1978. By 1983, this investment had risen to 593 
million, although the big leap took place from the mid-1980s onwards, with 3,505 million 
pesetas in 1988 and an accumulated total of 21,478 million between that year and 1999. The 
recent introduction of statistical methods which quantify the economic activity of this sector 
do not allow Renfe’s contribution to be weighed up. Nevertheless, we can make a rough 
estimate, given that according to the INE (National Institute of Statistics), Renfe’s investment 
in data processing represented 2% of the total output of the «office machines and equipment 
(including installation)» group between 1988 and 1992; 0.5% of the «net turnover of office 
machinery and computer equipment» between 1993 and 1998; whereas the 1998 investment 




4. The  «forward»  contribution 
 
The railway’s «forward» contribution consists, obviously, of the transport service it provides. 
In other words, it offers an alternative for transporting people and goods, insofar as its 
effectiveness -safety, reliability, speed and price-, helps to optimise one of the principal 
intermediate activities of the economy and, as an immediate consequence, directly improves 
the resulting economic processes.  
 
The evolution of the Spanish railway network has been characterised by its stability, since its 
length has increased by barely 4% during this second half of the century. What is really 
significant is that this dynamic was established in a context of economic modernization that 
brought with it a series of structural variations which, to a large extent, directly influence the 
what the railway offers. Firstly, there was a substantial change in the structure of the 
population that led to a higher concentration of inhabitants in a smaller number of provinces. 
Whereas in 1955 the five most heavily populated provinces (those with more than one million 
inhabitants
17) accounted for 24.9% of the total population, by 1997, this group of provinces, 
which now numbered eleven, contained 54.7% of the country’s population. This meant that 
25 provinces lost inhabitants during this period, while the population of the remaining 
provinces increased, although the provinces that gained the most inhabitants -Madrid, 
Barcelona, Valencia and Alicante- absorbed 61% of the total transfer. However, Madrid and 


















1955  1997  1955 1997 1955 1997 1955 1993 1955  1997 
MADRID  2.210 5.029  50.700  13.209.440 50.009 12.908.986 55.765 11.367.045 22.629 2.566.909
BARCELONA  2.506 4.612  66.349  11.665.942 65.620 11.414.689 62.425 9.495.451 26.185 2.474.998
VALENCIA  1.386 2.181  24.099 4.560.665 23.817 4.457.646 24.381 3.617.346 17.184 2.043.854
SEVILLA  1.160 1.722  14.842 2.520.926 14.666 2.462.179 14.931 1.900.499 12.643 1.429.837
ALICANTE  669 1.397  10.010 2.507.235 9.885 2.451.787 9.169 1.888.271 14.776 1.755.037
MÁLAGA  762 1.267 7.181 1.979.751 7.087 1.936.069 7.158 1.359.344 9.301 1.528.073
VIZCAYA  647 1.134  18.006 2.655.248 17.779 2.582.869 18.798 2.125.312 27.479 2.277.662
LA CORUÑA   973 1.111  10.612 1.995.862 10.478 1.940.846 10.327 1.514.788 10.769 1.746.936
CÁDIZ  753 1.110 8.191 1.599.950 8.094 1.568.858 8.627 1.181.916 10.749 1.413.386
MURCIA  777 1.107 7.894 1.804.360 7.791 1.753.292 8.012 1.336.287 10.027 1.583.823
ASTURIAS  934 1.084  15.312 1.953.060 15.132 1.891.268 14.950 1.593.170 16.201 1.744.712
a: thousands of inhabitants; b: millions of current pesetas  




Meanwhile, the production structure underwent a significant change when firstly the 
secondary sector and then the tertiary sector rose to a position of dominance to the detriment 
of the primary sector. From a regional perspective, it is worth pointing out that the provinces 
that contributed most of the VBAcf in 1955 -Madrid, Barcelona, the western part of the 
Cantabrian coast and Valencia- were also the most industrialized regions, whereas in 1997  
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this group continued to account for most of the output, but by this time the differences with  
respect to the rest had grown bigger, and it was the tertiary sector that represented the 
highest percentage. Finally, the GNPcf and RIB figures simply confirm everything that has 
been said so far, as is only logical to assume. Thus, as far as the first macroeconomic 
statistic is concerned, it should be noted that the relative weight of the four wealthiest 
provinces -Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia and Vizcaya- rose from 36.9% in 1955 to 39.6% in 
1997, whereas the second figure increased from 37.5% to 42.1%. But if there is one thing 
that stands out in particular, it is the fact that Madrid and Barcelona alone accounted for 
nearly a third of both values. 
 
In this context of rapid and far-reaching change, the structure of the railway network also 
underwent a substantial modification, which eventually gave rise to equally substantial 
modifications in the type of accessibility it offered. Although, logically, the density of the 
network hardly varied at all between 1941 and 1992, this was not a neutral event, given that 
whereas 26 provinces improved in this respect, 8 remained stable and 13 got worse. Besides 
Cuenca, whose particularly remarkable progress in this respect did not enable it move up in 
the general ranking, the provinces that advanced most were Madrid, Zamora, Orense and 
Segovia, whereas in the group of provinces that suffered, all of them with very similar values, 
the appearance of five Andalusian provinces is particularly striking, despite the considerable 
contribution of the AVE.  
 
With regard to autonomous regions, this analysis indicates that only Andalusia, Aragón and 
Murcia presented a negative balance and that Madrid was the region that underwent the 
most growth, its former density of 34 km of line/1,000 km
2 of surface area rising to 77 (i.e. an 
improvement of 116.7%), leaving La Rioja, Castile La Mancha and Galicia a long way 
behind. This development did not change the positions very much, given that the most 
industrialized regions -Catalonia, the Basque Country and Madrid- occupied the top three 
places in 1941 and continued to do so in 1992. 
 
If we broaden the scope of this analysis by taking into consideration the electrified and 
double-track lines, particularly necessary in a network as morphologically complicated as 
Spain’s, the differences mentioned above are accentuated even further. As regards the 
sections with electrified lines, the situation in 1941 was undeniably poor, given that only 9 
provinces had this type of installation. Although Barcelona accounted for 34.2% of the total, it 
was the Basque province of Guipúzcoa that had the highest density with a value of 49.6%. 
By 1992 this situation had undergone a spectacular transformation, given that 41 provinces 
now had electrified lines, with Tarragona, Barcelona, Madrid, Guipúzcoa and Álava leading 
the table. With regard to autonomous regions, in 1941 first place was occupied by the 
Basque Country with 15.8%, followed by Catalonia and Asturias and, considerably further 
behind, the other three regions that possessed these lines, whereas in 1992, only Murcia and 
Extremadura were still without electrified sections. But as in the previous case, the most 
significant fact is that Madrid leads the way with a value of 57.3%, followed by the Basque 
Country (41.2%) and Catalonia (40.3%), percentages that are double those of the remaining 
regions, except for La Rioja and Cantabria. Finally, as far as double-track lines are 
concerned, in 1941 there were 21 provinces which had this facility, although it is true that 
Guipúzcoa with 49.6% doubled the rest except for Barcelona, whose value was 25.2%. By 
1992 only four more provinces had joined this group, which was led by Guipúzcoa and 
Madrid with values that doubled the rest except for Barcelona. In terms of autonomous 
regions in 1941, Madrid and Basque Country, with 21.9% and 19.3% respectively, left the 
other eight regions trailing a long way behind. In 1992, La Rioja, Cantabria, Galicia, Murcia 
and Extremadura did not have any double-track railway sections, whereas Madrid (50.5%), 
the Basque Country (30.4%) and, somewhat further behind, Catalonia (15.8%) and Asturias 
(13.3%) monopolized this type of installation. 
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Table 11. Evolution of the density of the principal railway installations (km of line/1,000 km
2 of surface area) 














ALMERÍA 21,8  3,5  0,0  12,7  10,6  0,0 
CÁDIZ 27,5  0,0  0,0  18,7  10,3  0,0 
CÓRDOBA 32,0  0,0  0,3  33,6  24,3  9,5 
GRANADA 22,5  0,0  0,0  17,2  0,6  0,0 
HUELVA 19,2  0,0 0,0  19,8  6,3 0,0 
JAEN 22,2  0,0  0,0  17,3  9,1  0,0 
MÁLAGA 31,1  0,0  0,0  37,4  12,8 0,0 
SEVILLA 38,8  0,0 2,6  37,0  22,9 9,7 
HUESCA  22,1  0,0  0,0  19,2  7,9  0,0 
TERUEL  13,5  0,0  0,0  13,8  2,4  0,0 
ZARAGOZA  32,9  0,0  6,6  27,6  20,5  8,4 
ASTURIAS 16,5  5,0  0,0  19,9  19,9  13,3 
CANTABRIA  21,4  0,0  0,0  22,5  22,5  0,0 
ÁVILA 22,9  0,0  13,9  22,9  14,3  14,3 
BURGOS 30,6  0,0  9,1  24,3  11,4 10,5 
LEÓN 23,1  0,6  3,2  22,7  19,1  4,8 
PALENCIA 31,8  0,0  15,2  31,8  31,8  14,7 
SALAMANCA 39,7  0,0  0,0  33,4  0,0  0,0 
SEGOVIA 14,1  0,0  0,0  26,3  5,3  0,0 
SORIA 37,3  0,0  0,0  33,6  4,1  4,1 
VALLADOLID 38,2  0,0  11,0 38,2  15,2  11,5 
ZAMORA 14,3  0,0  0,0  28,9  0,0  0,0 
ALBACETE  19,1  0,0  6,7  19,1  13,3  12,8 
CIUDAD REAL  20,2  0,0  4,1  26,1  19,2  14,2 
CUENCA  0,6  0,0  0,0  11,8  0,2  0,2 
GUADALAJARA  8,9  0,0  7,3  9,8  9,8  9,8 
TOLEDO  23,7  0,0  5,0  26,9  10,6  9,7 
ALICANTE 33,3  0,0  0,0  34,3  14,8  0,0 
CASTELLÓN 29,9  0,0  0,0 29,9 19,6  5,1 
VALENCIA 34,2  0,0  5,2  39,2  13,6  9,0 
LA RIOJA  20,9  0,0  7,5  29,0  27,6  0,0 
MADRID 34,0  1,4  21,9  73,7  57,3  50,5 
MURCIA  30,1  0,0  0,0  23,9  0,0  0,0 
NAVARRA 21,2  0,0  0,5  23,3  19,7  5,2 
VIZCAYA  23,9  5,4  18,5  25,3  25,3  17,6 
GUIPÚZCOA  52,6  49,6  49,6  52,6  52,6  52,6 
ÁLAVA  37,4  1,3  0,0  45,3  45,3  25,3 
BARCELONA 59,2  19,7  25,2 64,0  64,0  41,0 
GERONA 36,7  12,4 3,6  34,8  34,8 20,0 
LÉRIDA 15,5  0,0  0,0 20,8 13,0  0,0 
TARRAGONA 61,4  0,0  10,2 68,8  68,8  11,1 
BADAJOZ  24,2  0,0  0,0  24,2  0,0  0,0 
CÁCERES  15,7  0,0  0,0  16,7  0,0  0,0 
LA CORUÑA  21,4  0,0 0,0  31,0  0,0 0,0 
LUGO 20,4  0,0  0,0  20,4  7,9  0,0 
ORENSE 20,4  0,0  0,0  38,2  14,0 0,0 
PONTEVEDRA 52,4  0,0  0,0  55,6  23,5  0,0 
TOT.....  25,2  0,9  3,5  26,9  14,0  6,5 
Source: Independently produced on the basis of Manuel J. MEGIA PUENTE , “Distribución de la 
infraestructura ferroviaria de Renfe en el territorio peninsular español. Análisis en relación con la 
superficie, la población y la renta a nivel de comunidades autónomas y provincias”, (Madrid, Revista TCC 





From what has been said it can be deduced that the provinces which had the biggest 
increases in their population and income were those that improved their railway installations, 
and the province that did so most of all was Madrid. In short, the railway provided the 
conditions necessary for fulfilling the new transport needs of the emerging centres of 
population, without which this activity would have been more costly and industrialization and 
tertiarization probably slower. But this also gave rise to a significant imbalance in the 
accessibility which the railway transport system offered from a territorial point of view, given 
that the average density of the railway installations in the three best-equipped regions with 
respect to the rest increased from 1.6 times higher in 1941 to 2.1 times higher in 1992. 
 
Table 12. Evolution of the infrastructure 
stock (thousands of millions of 1990 
pesetas) 
 
  Year  Stock  Year Stock Year Stock 
1929 1.036 1952 647 1975 1.468
1930 1.029 1953 629 1976 1.535
1931 1.029 1954 622 1977 1.599
1932 1.030 1955 633 1978 1.616
1933 1.037 1956 643 1979 1.668
1934 1.033 1957 648 1980 1.691
1935 1.040 1958 661 1981 1.701
1936 993 1959 669 1982 1.722
1937 946 1960 685 1983 1.785
1938 901 1961 704 1984 1.811
1939 857 1962 715 1985 1.829
1940 831 1963 738 1986 1.842
1941 808 1964 754 1987 1.891
1942 788 1965 781 1988 1.953
1943 803 1966 831 1989 2.020
1944 837 1967 891 1990 2.133
1945 807 1968 945 1991 2.260
1946 773 1969 1.001 1992 2.345
1947 739 1970 1.065 1993 2.409
1948 705 1971 1.137 1994 2.446
1949 682 1972 1.235 1995 2.472
1950 660 1973 1.309 1996 2.508
1951 637 1974 1.364 1997 2.575
Source: V. Cucarrela, El «Stock» de capital 
ferroviario en España y sus provincias: 1845-




The national railway network’s contribution to economic modernization could not achieve its 
full potential if it were not based directly on improving the quality of its systems and 
installations, given that they determine the safety and speed of transport that the network is 
able to offer, i.e., its productive capacity. In this respect, the railway took a dramatic step 
backwards during the forties and fifties, a setback it only managed to overcome with great  
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difficulty as from the introduction of the PDM. Therefore, we are looking at an infrastructure 
that, between 1950 and 1999, slowly evolved from being extremely deficient to highly 
productive, featuring many aspects at the forefront of technological innovation
19.  
 
Although we already knew that the investments in infrastructure had suffered an important 
setback during the 1929-1963 period
20, Cucarella’s excellent recent work
21 is a particularly 
noteworthy contribution, given that it enables us to understand this matter more clearly. 
According to his calculations, the average investment in infrastructure fell from 87,800 million 
constant pesetas (1990) during the 1929-35 period to 50,300 million during the long 1936-
1962 period, although it is much more important to discover that the infrastructure «stock» 
underwent a tremendously negative evolution, since although its index remained stable at a 
value of 100 between 1929 to 1935, it dropped by 17.7% during the Civil War. This being a 
major setback, it was merely the first stage of a sharp decline which, with the sole and 
relatively insignificant exceptions of 1943-44 and 1952, reached its lowest point in 1962 with 
62.1%, before beginning a steady yet slow recovery thanks to the application of the PDM 
which, nevertheless, was unable to facilitate a return to the pre-war level until 1970. The 
extraordinary magnitude of this slump deprived the Spanish railway of a suitable 
infrastructure for providing an increasingly expanding service, precisely during a stage in 
which its main competitor consolidated itself. During the years that followed, investments 
steadily increased and, despite certain instabilities between 1973 and 1986 and a sharp 
decline between 1992 and 1995, were sufficient for dealing with the depreciation of the 
infrastructure, since the «stock» always evolved positively, rising from a factor of 102.8 to 
248.6 between 1970 and 1997.  
 
  
Table 13.  Fastest daily runs on the main routes (hours). 
1920 1929 1944  1950  1960 1981 2000  ROUTE 







Madrid-Barcelona 14,31 12,35 14,40  14,42 22,45 8,03 9,05 8,06 6,30 9,00 2,30 -0,55 -1,36 
Madrid-Irun 11,49 10,43 12,15  12,05 20,40 8,35 8,15 6,46 6,10 9,07 2,57 -1,29 -0,36 
Madrid-La Coruña  19,10 17,40 20,15 19,20 22,35 3,15 12,30 9,45 8,20 10,10 1,50 -2,45 -1,25 
Madrid-Sevilla 12,40 10,40 11,20  11,56 16,00 4,04 8,05 6,10 2,15 3,17 1,02 -1,55 -3,55 
Madrid-Málaga 14,02 12,40 13,45  14,00 19,30 5,30 10,15 7,16 4,00 11,30 7,30 -3,01 -3,16 
Madrid-Almería 13,25 14,50  15,45 19,55 4,10 9,30 7,30 6,49 9,15 2,26 -2,00 -0,41 
Madrid-Gijón 12,15 14,30  15,00-  -  10,30 7,53 6,21 9,35 3,14 -2,37 -1,32 
Madrid-Bilbao 9,45 11,10  10,40 18,55 8,15 9,45 5,46 5,40 9,15 2,35 -3,59 -0,06 
Madrid-Alicante 11,55 8,55 9,15  10,00 12,50 2,50 6,45 5,03 3,50 3,55 0,05 -1,42 -1,13 
Madrid-Valencia 11,25 9,30 10,15  10,15 13,45 3,30 6,30 4,48 3,25 7,04 3,39 -1,42 -1,23 
Barcelona-
Valencia 
8,31 7,27 9,45 6,25 10,58 4,33 5,40 4,21 2,53 5,10 2,17 -1,19 -1,28 
Barcelona-Portbou 3,27 2,55 6,15 4,40 5,50 1,10 2,48 1,51 1,59 2,30 0,31 -0,57  +0,08 
Barcelona-Irún -  12,15  16,38 23,45 7,07 12,40 12,03 8,26 10,33 2,07 -0,37 -3,37 
Madrid-Paris 27,10 22,24-  22,15 33,41 11,26 18,35 14,35 13,29- -  -4,00  -1,06 
Madrid-Lisboa 15,34 15,17 12,50  13,20 27,45 14,25 12,50 9,02 9,55- -  -3,48  +0,53 
Barcelona-París 23,05 17,36-  20,20 22,50 2,30 13,21 11,40 12,09- -  -1,41  +0,29 
Source: Independently produced on the basis of Renfe’s Timetable Guides. 
a: Best Comercial Timetable; b: Worst Comercial Timetable; c: Difference between the best 
and the worst commercial timetable. In 1950 there was a 7-hour route between Madrid and 




Table 13 shows the fastest daily passenger service runs on the network’s most important 
routes. Even though this is an excessively general indicator, it does convey to a large extent 
the quality of the service offered by the railway. The Civil War unarguably represented a big 
step backwards in the improvement which the railway had been undergoing since 1920, 
given that the fastest runs on the national routes in 1944 took an average of two hours longer 
than in 1929. Moreover, some of them -those which connected Madrid and Barcelona, Irún 
and La Coruña, and those which linked Barcelona to Valencia and Portbou- were slower than 
in 1920. If we move ahead to 1950, we see that the second half of the 1940s signified a 
stagnation of these values as a result of there being no significant variations. The only 
changes corresponded to minor improvements, except on the Barcelona-Valencia and 
Barcelona-Portbou routes. In short, at the beginning of the 1950s the service offered by 
Renfe, according to these figures, was much worse than the service provided by the private 
companies in 1929 and, in some cases, worse than in 1920. 
 
It was during the 1950s that this spectacular decline was overcome, and by 1960 the journey 
times on the main national routes had improved significantly in comparison with 1950, 
particularly between Madrid and La Coruña (an improvement of 6 hours and 50 minutes), 
between Madrid and Almería (6 hours and 15 minutes) and between Madrid and Barcelona 
(5 hours and 37 minutes). The 21-year period between 1960 and 1981 produced positive 
results in all cases, albeit to a lesser extent in comparison with the previous period. 
Nevertheless, the following reductions were particularly significant: 3 hours and 59 minutes 
between Madrid and Bilbao, 3 hours between Madrid and Málaga and 2 hours and 45 
minutes between Madrid and La Coruña.  
 
In spite of these significant improvements in journey times, in 1981 none of the long-distance 
journey times could compete with air transport, given that any journey over a distance of 
approximately 500 km took the equivalent of a working day. This scenario was radically 
changed by the opening of the Madrid-Seville high-speed line, as regards the routes which 
link Madrid to the southern part of the peninsula, since the journey takes no more than two 
hours and 15 minutes. Thanks to the benefit provided by this line, the Madrid-Málaga journey 
takes four hours, whereas in relation to the most westerly and easterly points of Andalusia, 
this benefit may not be as great, yet is still appreciable nonetheless. If high speed constitutes 
the railway’s most important contribution ever in this dimension, we must not forget that 
another great advance took place on the Madrid-Alicante, Madrid-Valencia and Barcelona-
Valencia axes with respective journey times of 3 h 50 m, 3 h 25 m and 2h 53m thanks to the 
Alaris and Euromed «high-speed» trains. However, neither should we conceal the fact that 
the northern routes, even though all of them have undergone significant reductions, still 
require a journey time of six hours.  
 
In column c1 and c2 of 1950 and 2000, the difference between the fastest and slowest run on 
each one of the routes has been calculated. Although the slowest run always corresponds to 
overnight journeys (the time being determined by commercial factors not related to speed
22) 
and consequently introduces a bias, it does give us a clearer insight into the evolution 
mentioned earlier. In fact, the difference between both cases was very substantial in 1950, 
indicative of a polarized service, i.e., one that concentrated its scarce resources on a few 
trains of higher quality and price, with low-quality and exasperatingly slow trains at the other 
extreme. In the year 2000 the differences are much less marked and owe more to the above-






Table 14.  Evolution of Renfe’s passenger fares and average goods
(1980 ptas). 
Year 1
st Class  2
nd  Class  3





Average income per t/km of 
freight transported 
 
1941    2,04 6,94
1942    2,05 5,98
1943    1,99 6,18
1944    1,90 5,86
1945    2,36 6,99
1946 5,775 4,142 2,589 2,14 5,94
1947 4,905 3,518 2,199 1,93 5,12
1948 4,772 3,470 2,169 1,92 4,70
1949 4,632 3,369 2,106 1,88 4,55
1950 5,581 4,059 2,537 2,08 5,46
1951 5,100 3,709 2,318 1,98 5,39
1952 5,202 3,783 2,365 2,05 5,50
1953 5,121 3,724 2,328 2,05 5,38
1954 5,339 3,828 2,409 2,26 5,88
1955 5,133 3,681 2,316 2,27 5,87
1956 4,769 3,691 2,307 2,20 5,59
1957 5,107 3,670 2,302 2,53 6,28
1958 5,447 4,107 2,551 2,44 6,37
1959 6,491 4,775 2,952 2,48 7,39
1960 7,075 5,183 3,209 3,13 9,21
1961 6,955 5,095 3,154 3,08 9,16
1962 6,564 4,809 2,977 2,88 7,88
1963 6,028 4,416 2,734 2,60 6,93
1964 5,644 4,134 2,559 2,57 6,86
1965 4,983 3,650 2,260 2,54 6,23
1966 4,685 3,432 2,124 2,65 5,76
1967 5,023 3,324 2,266 2,63 5,05
1968 4,795 3,174 2,163 3,44 4,98
1969 4,693 3,106 2,117 3,31 4,67
1970 4,918 3,254 3,24 4,27
1971 4,840 3,011 3,20 4,25
1972 4,681 3,096 3,02 4,10
1973 4,204 2,781 3,05 3,70
1974 4,399 2,843 2,65 3,50
1975 4,344 2,888 2,59 3,67
1976 4,088 2,707 2,75 4,03
1977 4,131 2,754 2,57 3,83
1978 4,212 2,808 2,71 4,21
1979 3,641 2,428 2,42 3,93
1980 3,372 2,248 2,13 3,76
1981 3,268 2,178 2,03 3,51
1982 3,170 2,112 2,04 3,29
1983 3,136 2,090 1,90 3,15
1984 3,020 2,012 1,88 2,76
1985 2,974 1,981 1,95 2,64
1986 3,139 2,094 1,84 2,46
1987 2,987 1,990 1,90 2,39
1988 3,138 1,993 1,91 2,32
1989 3,171 1,958 1,95 2,27
1990 6,050 3,926 2,08 2,25 
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1991 6,117 3,948 2,15 2,20
1992 5,691 3,910 2,24 2,18
1993  2,13 1,97
1994  2,12 1,76
1995  2,14 1,64
Source: Renfe’s Timetable Guides for 1st, 2nd 3rd class and Miguel Muñoz, Renfe (1941-
1991). Medio siglo de ferrocarril público, (Madrid, Ed. Luna, 1995). 
 
 
Besides the absence of monographic studies, the complexity involved in the analysis of fares 
makes it impossible to draw any definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, table 14 reproduces 
the evolution of the base passenger fare, which, as can be seen, describes a downward 
curve in real terms over time: in 1950 the base fare went up by 66%, which marked the 
beginning of the first period of price control, which came to an end in 1957, when a second 
stage leading up to 1960 saw a real increase in fare prices; the third stage covers the period 
between 1960 and 1989, in which the base fare gradually fell from 5.183 to 1.958 pesetas in 
second class, i.e. a 62% decrease, whereas the first class fare reduction was only 55%; and 
finally, in 1989, the biggest increase took place due to the introduction of VAT. Particularly 
striking is the almost absolute convergence between the value of the income per 
passenger/km and the value of the base fare in the lowest class (initially third class and, 
since 1969, second class), which indicates the relative importance that these passenger 
segments always had. Therefore, we should conclude that the railway transport price always 
increased below the cost of living, which resulted in serious financial problems for Renfe. 
 
 
In the case of goods, the complexity involved in analysing the evolution of the fares is even 
greater than in the case of passengers, since each material had its own particular fare, and 
even then, private negotiation with each client often prevailed. In spite of these difficulties, we 
have reproduced in table 14 the curve of income per goods, which presents the following 
evolution: a continuous descent between 1941-49, except for the increase in 1945; moderate 
growth between 1949 and 1956; a sharp increase between 1956 and 1961, the biggest of the 
entire series at 63.9%; and a final stage of continuous descent between 1961 and 1995 
(except for the brief rise between 1974 and 1978), where the value  drops from 3.50.16 





Throughout these pages we have evaluated the Spanish broad gauge railway’s contribution 
to Spain’s economic development during the second half of the 20
th century. This evaluation 
cannot be regarded as any more than an initial estimation -an aspect that perhaps has not 
been sufficiently stressed- given that we have chosen a methodology which we have not 
been able to apply to its fullest extent due to an insufficient availability of the necessary 
statistics, and also because important aspects of railway activity are still not known. 
Nevertheless, I believe the end result, beyond the necessary refinements, does provide a 
general understanding of this dynamic. 
 
The first conclusion we can draw is that the Spanish railway presented more intense 
backward effects when, paradoxically, its forward effects were, if not worse, then certainly of 
a regressive nature. In fact, during Franco’s regime the Spanish railway, which was barely 
capable of maintaining its traditional market shares, which started plummeting in 1950, 
presented its highest levels of contribution to the rest of the known sectors -employment, 
manufacturing of rolling stock, energy, iron and steel, etc.- while its forward contributions 
underwent, as a consequence of the concatenation of the Civil War and Autarchy, a decline 
of such magnitude that its service fell below the standards achieved during the 1920s.  
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The analysis of the structure of the resources used by Renfe during these years, which over 
the whole of the second half of the 20
th century only represented an insignificant part of the 
total, indicates national coal and, above all, the rolling stock construction sector as sole 
beneficiaries. Although maintaining its permanent employees was its main contribution, it 
should not be forgotten that this personnel was subjected to an extreme exploitation which 
must cast doubt on any positive interpretation. Therefore, in the context of an economic 
structure that was much simpler than the one that exists today, Spanish society was forced 
to suffer a totally deficient (i.e. unsafe, slow and uncomfortable) railway transport service 
which, moreover, was the only alternative available for most of this period. 
 
On the contrary, in comparison with the serious detrimental effect of Franco’s regime on the 
railway, Democracy has brought about not only its recovery, but also the consolidation of 
substantial changes in certain key aspects that have enabled the railway to regain a 
dynamism that had been absent for many decades. This explains a further paradox, albeit a 
reversal of the one that characterised the previous stage, i.e. as opposed to a more modest 
backward contribution, as shown by all the indicators used, the service, in the context of the 
land transport revolution which saw the motor car drastically reduce the previously dominant 
railway’s market share, has undergone substantial progress thanks to the general 
improvement of all its aspects -safety, speed and comfort
23- and, in particular, thanks to 
specialization in the transportation of goods, combined transport and, more recently, high 
speed, although it should also be stated that this advance has been accompanied by a 
reduction in regional accessibility. However, even though Renfe has demanded less from the 
different sectors, its total contribution to the GNP has been much more significant in itself 
than in the previous stage. 
 
Having emerged from the long tunnel of Autarchy to embark on the slow recovery which took 
place during the 1960s, the last 25 years have seen the Spanish railway make a dynamic 
contribution to the economic modernization of Spanish society, guaranteeing a wide range of 
economic sectors a demand which help to maintain them, although the main beneficiaries in 
historical terms have been permanent employment, the energy sector and the rolling stock 
construction sector. All of which finally results in a potential stemming directly from 
Democracy which seems to indicate that this 150-year period will see the railway regain a 
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